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Abstract 
 The paper treats alternative views about a materialist conception of 
the subject of experiences or the  self or person. Some views are that the self 
is the brain, or the whole person, or that there is no self or subject of 
experiences. We lay out each view and their advantages and disadvantages. 
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 There is a long tradition in philosophy, beginning wih ancient 
philosophers, about the nature of the self, soul, spirit, mind or subject of 
mental states or experiences. Many of these of these views were expounded 
by dualists on the nature of a person. One popular form of dualism is that a 
person is a combination of two substances, a mental substance and a material 
substance. Both the mental substance and the physical substance can exist 
independently of each other. The mental substance can exist without the 
body as a disembodied mind, and the physical substance or body can exist 
without the mind. There are other versions of dualism, and they all hold that 
our psychology or mental states are nonphysical  or immaterial in nature. 
This paper considers what a materialist can say about the nature of a person 
or self as a subject of experiences.  
 To begin we will say what we are including under “materialism.” One 
view of materialism is known as the Identity Theory (IT).  The IT is based on 
the belief that the mind is the brain. A person's mental states are identical 
with the firings of particular neurons, or cells, in the brain. Pain, for example, 
is a neurological state. Other mental states are neurological states, even if we 
do not yet know what they are. The IT comes in different forms, but we are 
interested only in what the IT takes the subject of experiences to be. 
 Another current kind of materialism is known as Functionalism. The 
core idea of Functionalism is that mental states are neurological states of a 
physical system that serve the same functions as the neuron firings serve 
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when we are in that mental state. The functions of neuron firings of mental 
states are spelled out in terms of environmental inputs, behavioral outputs, 
and relations to other mental states. Functionalism has joined the IT as a 
leading theory of the mind. This view impies that any complex system can 
have a mind and that the physical composition of the system does not matter. 
 The human is made of flesh and blood, but this is not essential. We 
could be made of other stuff, like aliens, and still be “thinking beings.” We 
could even  be made of silicon chips, like computers.  
 For this reason, researchers in artificial intelligence are attracted to 
Functionalism. The functionalist holds that the mind can be seen as a type of 
digital computer. The relation between body and mind is like the relation 
between hardware and software in a computer. A computer accepts inputs, 
performs  operations on them, and produces outputs. The human brain works 
in the same way. The mind is simply a program running in the brain like the 
software of the computer. Although Functionalism is logically compatible 
with dualism and nonphysical mental states, most hold that mental states ae 
realized in the brain and central nervous system. We shall take the IT and 
Functionalism to be what we are calling materialism. 
 We will now deal with the problem of this paper. Just what physical 
aspects or thing would a materialist point to as being the subject of 
experiences or mental states? It is not clear that this question admits of any 
single answer, so we will do no more than lay out what seems to be some 
plausible alternatives and their difficulties. 
 The question is partly an empirical question. The location of the 
“subject” surely must depend on where we find mental states of events. 
Many proponents of IT, most notably J. J. C. Smart, maintain that “the 
verdict is overwhelmingly in favor of the brain” on the question of where we 
find mental states.1 If we have to choose between identifying mental 
properties with brain properties rather than properties of the heart or liver, 
then the location problem is an empirical one. Philosophers like Smart think 
that perceptions, sensations, images, thoughts, feelings, and all the elements 
that are “given” in conscious awareness, are, in fact, brain processes or 
states. If the mental elements or “given” are actually physical processes in 
the brain, it is a short step to make the perceiving self or subject of 
experiences identical with the brain.  This is not to say that a person is, in 
fact, his brain because the  concept of a person is only partly a subject of 
experiences. A person is just as much his entire body, even if the subject of 
experiences is the brain, since a person is also a subject of physical states in 
general. And although all mental states are physical states according to 
                                                 
1          J.J.C. Smartt, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” Philosophical Review, 
Vol. 68, 1959, p. 46. 
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materialism, there are physical states that are not also mental states. The 
terms involved in speaking of subjects of mental states and physical states 
are not synonymous, and it is at least an open question whether the subjects 
spoken of are coextensive.  
 Elsewhere, Smart attempts to bring out the fundamental role the brain 
and brain processes play in an adequate concept of mind. He compares  
behaviorists who deny the importance of inner physiological processes with 
instrumentalist views about the nature of thoretical entities in physics. Smart 
argues that we “can conceive of” a  universe consisting of electrons,  
protons, and the like, that never come together as constituents of microscopic 
objects. He concludes that “on this supposition...there could be 
electrons...but no microscopic objects.”2 
 Smart thinks mental states are analogous to electrons in this respect 
and argues that there is no clear sense in which (pain) experiences are 
grammatical fictions. He asks us to consider a future state of physiological 
technology where “we might be able to keep a human brain alive in vitro.” 
By stimulating the brain with electrodes, we could give it the illusion of 
perceiving things, make it feel pain, arouse its desires, stimulate it to reason, 
and the like. Since this thought experiment is a case in which we would have 
mental experiences,  but no behavior, Smart says, “This brings out vividly 
that what is important in psychology is what goes on in the central nervous 
system, not what goes on larynx, or limbs.” This is supposed to show that 
there is a clear sense in which mental  experiences are not grammatical 
fictions out of behavior, but they are “entities such as are postulated in a 
hypothesis (which) could still exist even if there had been no possible 
evidence for them.” His preference for the brain as the locus of mental 
experiences, rather than the entire body,  comes out when he concludes that 
“...the example of the brain in vitro shows that what is essential to a pain is 
what goes on in the brain, not what goes on in the arms or legs or larynx or 
mouth.”3 
 It seems clear that nothing of this sort does follow about what is 
“essential” to thoughts and sensations. When Smart asks us to consider the 
brain in vitro, he is talking about what “could happen”  and what we “can 
conceive of,” If we take him to be speaking of is merely logically possible, 
then,  as Norman Malcolm points out, his “imagined case could not offer any 
evidence that the  important for the existence of thoughts and sensations than 
outward behavior.”4 In terms of the location problem, this thought 
                                                 
2   J.J.C. Smart, “Materialism,” Journal of Phil., Vol. 60, October, 1963, p. 659. 
3   J.J.C. Smart, Ibid., p. 660. 
4   Norman Malcolm, “Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory,” Journ. Of 
Phil., Vol. 60, 1963, p. 663. 
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experiment does not show that the brain is more likely to be the locus of the 
subject of experiences than the entire body and its behavior. 
        If Smart were to suggest the view that there is a stong likelihood that the 
brain in vitro could 
undergo all the mental states it was capable of in its embodied existence, 
then the question of the possible evidence would become stronger. In 
particular, in order to conclude that mental states are 
most likely to be located in the brain, some of the problems that face the IT 
would have to be settled. 
We would have to have more well established reliable psychophysical laws 
to the effect that a person has a mental state M if he has a brain state B at 
time t. We would also need a device for detecting the 
presence of the relevant brain states. If so, the likelihood of a brain in vitro 
undergoing all the usual 
mental experiences clearly presupposes that the location problem for mental 
events has already been solved, and therefore cannot be used as evidence for 
specifying the locus of the subject of experiences than the entire body and its 
behavior. 
 The literature on brains in a vat supports Smart's position. Consider 
the following. Imagine an advanced stage of science where we can remove a 
person's brain and keep it alive in a vat of nutrients. Scientists hook up the 
brain to a computer that supplies it with the kind of inputs that normally 
comes from the eyes and ears. If the computer does the job well enough, the 
person will believe is is actually perceiving physical objects. The person will 
have normal experiences, but his life will be a computer-generated ilusion. 
The question is raised of how you can prove this wrong. You can do nothing 
to prove you are not now a brain in a vat. This thought experiment seems to 
favor Smart's position. 
 We will now consider consider some difficulties in taking the brain as 
the subject of experiences. 
 There are two different kinds of considerations relevant to the 
location problem. One is the development of brain theory or 
neurophysiology. The other is less important in the end, but easier to make 
progress on, especially in philosophy. It involves the analysis of particular 
common sense  psychological concepts insofar as they provide clues to the 
location of mental states. 
 Let us consider the development of science first. If science were to 
develop psychophysical correlation laws of the sort envisaged by the IT, the 
physicalistic variables of the laws would tell us a lot about the location of 
mental states. Although laws do not contain reference to space-time regions, 
the physicalistic variables may refer to specific types of neural processes 
going on in the brain, or the brain together with the entire central nervous 
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system. At present we have only relatively crude and sketchy correlations 
between mental functions, such as memory, and gross areas of the brain. An 
ideal development would be to find out what part of the human body or brain 
and its states are present whenever mental states are, and absent whenever 
the relevant kind of mental states are, and this is no small task.       
 The description under which the mental and physical properties to be 
identified are placed in the correlation laws is also relevant to the location 
problem. In some forms of the IT, the features to be identified are described 
as “Jones thinking about x” and “Jones being in brain state B.” In this case 
the location of the thought is specified by locating the individual Jones and 
no further. One writer construes the psychological term of the identity as 
“having a pain in the skin” and being in a certain physical state. The state of 
the body is located as precisely it can be by locating the whole body.5 
Similarly, one is having a pain wherever his body happens to be. But this 
seems a bit evasive. Some mental states may have the entire body as their 
locus. Now if having a sensation is identical with having a brain process B, 
and B Has a particular location in the brain, then the sensation must have the  
same specific location. And it does seem we can say more about the location 
of neuron firings,  chemical reactions, and electrical patterns than pointing to 
the individual to whom they occur. 
 What might be a plausible line to take on this alternative is to locate 
the “subject of consciousness” by locating the person.  Although it is 
somewhat precipitous to decide that mental events have no more specific 
location than to the person they occur to, it might well be plausible to locate 
the subject of mental states where the individual of person is. It is precisely 
because a person is referred to be a sentence where 'I' is used as a 
grammatical subject, and which employs both both psychological and 
physical predicates, that we say that a  person is a “subject of experiences”  
at all. Jerome Shaffer has said that a person is defined as a subject of 
experiences. This would make it confusing to say that a person is just a 
human body, but the subject of experiences is the brain. For  “person” and 
“subject of experiences” are connected analytically. If mental states are 
found to be mostly located in the body or parts of the body, it is reasonable to 
identify the subject of experience with the entire human body, and not just 
the human brain. Consider the emotion of fear. Fear is a disturbed or upset 
condition of the entire body. Its conative content is a tendency to avoid.  The 
body grows tense, becomes stiff, causes the subject to sweat a lot, and one 
may be unable to move. 
 More recent literature in cognitive science supports the thesis that 
cognition is affected and located in the entire body. Alvin I. Goldman has 
                                                 
5    Thomas Nagel, “Physicalism,” Philosophical Review, Vol. 74, July, 1965.  
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supported the view that much of human cognition has its origins in the 
human body. He says that recent empirical findings in cognitive science lead 
one in this direction.This is known as embodied cognition.6               
 Here is a taste of some of the things Goldman and other cognitive 
theorists have said about mental states.  
In another paper Goldman says  “Many other systems are dedicated to other 
body-oriented topics. The primary somatosensory cortex is dedicated to 
representing the condition of (all parts of) the  surface of the body. The so 
called pain matrix is a complex system consisting of two functionally 
specialized networks. The sensory discrimination component represents the 
intensity of pain and its bodily location. The affective component represents 
the unpleasantness of a  painful experience. It recruits the anterior insula, the 
anterior singulate cortex, the thalamus, and the brain stem. In relatively 
recent work (Craig, 2002) a system of representation of the entire body that 
he calls“interoception” (a distinct species of inner sense). This system, the 
lamina I spinothalamocrtical system, conveys signals from small diameter 
primary afferents that represent the physiological status of all body tissues. 
Lamina I neurons project to the posterior part of the ventromedial nucleus or 
Vmpo. Craig calls the Vmpo “interoceptive cortex” and argues it contains 
representations of distinct, highly resolved sensations, including different 
types of pain, tickle, temperature, itch, muscular and visceral sensations, and 
sensory  input.”7 
 We might be well advised to drop any talk of “subjects of 
experience” at all. We speak of objects in the world that are referred to by 
grammatical subjects, such as physical things, yet we do not speak of 
subjects of physical states. We can speak of persons or human beings as 
having mental  states, but we can do away with speaking of persons as 
“subjects” having mental states. If all we mean by a “subject having mental 
states” can be cashed out by simply speaking of a person or  human being, 
we may well drop talk about subjects of consciousness. Then the only 
location question left will be where to locate the person who has the mental 
states, and we do that by locating their body.  
 There is a lot of literature on those who have denied that there is any 
                                                 
6    Alvin I. Goldman, “A  Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science,” The 
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 
 Vol. 3, No. 1, 2012, pp. 71-88. This article claims that  cognition is “embodied” 
taking account of empirical evidence and contemporary cognitive science. Antonio Damasio 
supports Goldman in his Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and Feeling Pain,Orlando Fla., 
Harcourt, 2003. Esp. Ch. 3 on feelings.  
7    Alvin I. Goldman, “The Bodily Format Approach to Embodied Cognition,” 
Current Controversies in Philosophy or Mind, ed. by Uriah Kriegel, Routledge, 2014, p. 
101. 
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real self or subject of experiences. David Hume famously denied that he had 
any knowledge or perception of a self in his  experience. He said he cannot 
form a sense impression or mental image of a self. The self is a fiction. 
A J. Ayer made a similar move in the 20th century along with other strict 
empiricists. He denied that we can have any sense perception of the self. 
 Sydney Shoemaker gave a definitive criticism of the empirical 
denials of  the self based on sense perception. Shoemaker asks us to consider 
“I see a tree.” This statement is true just in case there is a tree there, and I am 
looking at it, paying attention, and so on. I cannot come to realize that is I 
who am seeing the tree, because I cannot discover that there is a tree in my 
visual field and that I am not perceiving it. The tree cannot be given in 
experience at all unless it is given as my perception of the tree. I cannot 
perceive the tree, and perceive myself, and see that it is I who am in the 
relation  of perceiving with the tree. For, if I could do that, it would have to 
be possible for me to perceive myself, and see the tree, and see that it was a 
fact about myself, that I am not perceiving the tree. Clearly this is not 
possible because the relation of perceiving is not an empirical, contingent 
relation. For the self and the object of perception are co-determinative; each 
is a necessary condition for the other. Thus it is self-contradictory to suppose 
that I could perceive a tree, and realize, as a fact about this perceptual 
relation, that it is not me perceiving the tree. But this should be possible if 
we are to account for self-awareness soley in terms of what is exclusively 
perceived by myself.8 
 The notion of a subject is often introduced as an analysis of 
perceptual awareness. Awareness of something x is thought to involve a 
relation between something which is aware, a subject of awareness, and the 
object they are aware of. Perhaps a materialist should resist this analysis and 
eshew the use if the technical term “subject” since it does not do any work 
for us which cannot be done by speaking of  a person or human being that 
which is aware of objects and is that which has experiences. We can avoid 
the solemn phrase “The Subject of Experiences” that fills chapter headings in 
books and  dissertations, since it misleads us into looking for something that 
has experiences other than the person  themselves, often something “inside” 
the person. 
 Probably the most important reason for disussions of a subject of 
experiences comes from the vast literature on self-awareness or self-
knowledge of the mental. Considerations about how we know the self  have 
influenced some philosophers who are dualists to say that the subject of 
                                                 
8    Sydney Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Cornell University Press, 
Ch, 4, 1963. This is a fatal criticism to empricists who deny the existence of a self on 
perceptual grounds. 
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experiences is a mental substance or thing that is nonphysical or immaterial 
in nature. I have argued elsewhere that self-awareness if the subject of 
mental states is actually awareness of a mental substance, but that substance 
could be realized in something physical. One can be aware of their mental 
states and self-aware of something that has the mental states. However, I 
contend that awareness of mental states does not inform us by itself on the 
nature of those mental states; on whether they are nonphysical or physical in 
nature. Similarly, awareness that I am a subject of mental states does not by 
itself tell the knower whether the self or subject is nonphysical or physical in 
nature. I am aware of myself as what is having  mental states, and aware of a 
mental substance, but the nature of that substance is an open question.9 We 
will not plunge into a treatment of the literature on self-knowledge of the self 
here.    
 Let us now consider some ways in which our ordinary talk about 
minds and particular psychological concepts have a bearing on the location 
of mental states. Gilbert Ryle has pointed out that we say we are doing 
mental arithmetic 'in  our head' rather than on paper, and where a man may 
say he still has a catchy tune or jingle 'running in his head.' This is about as 
far as we can go in common sense in locating mental events in the brain. 
Ryle argues that this sort of talk is highly metaporical since a surgeon could 
not open your brain and detect any calculation going on, or listening to the 
tune with a stethoscope the way a doctor listens to my heartbeat10.  But the 
same point could be made for a computer. We could not detect it calculating 
by looking at the hardware or circuit boards. David M. Armstrong points out 
where we can speak of 'having brains' (an acute mind), and of a 'brain-child',  
'brainstorm,' 'racking one's brain' and 'brainwashing' in connection with the 
mind. Other colloquialisms such as 'egghead' suggest a close connection 
between the brain and cognitive functions. Having a 'good mind' and a 'good 
head on your shoulders' are often used interchangably. 
 Yet there is a sense in which whatever we can say about the parts of 
the body we can often say about the whole body. We say of a car that 'the 
carburator isn't working properly' and we can also say 'the car isn't working 
properly.' We could say 'the door is rattling' instead of 'the car is rattling' 
when we want to be more specific. This suggests that the specification of the 
physical locus of the subject of experiences is partly a terminological matter. 
Even if mental events are identified with events in the brain, and the brain is 
designated as the subject of mental events, it is still possible to speak of the 
                                                 
9   Thomas W. Smythe, “Intuiting the Self,” Psychology of Intuition, edited by 
Bartoli Ruelas and Vanessa Briseno, Nova 
 Science Publishers, September 2010. 
10    Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Barnes and Noble, 1949, p. 74.  
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whole person, or the entire human body, as having or undergoing mental 
events. This is complicated even more by the fact that human beings are 
often construed as agents, and mental activities are often thought of as what 
the agent or entire physical organism is engaged in. Instead of saying the 
brain thinks when one is racking his brains, we say a man thinks with his 
brain. The brain is considered to be an instrument of thought or something 
we use to think with. But it still may be proper to  specify some part of a 
man, such as the brain, as being that which has the mental states, or being 
that in which the mental states occur. 
 Our concepts of some mental states may preclude a specification of a 
particular locale for them at all. Richard Taylor hold that thoughts are not 
existing things or entities that exist in the head. He conceives of thinking as 
an activity we perform just like waltzing, playing chess, or solving 
algorithms with pencil and paper. Thinking might be seen as something we 
do 'in our heads' and not something that results in thoughts that are identical 
with brain states.11 Taylor's point is consistent with saying that thinking is an 
activity in the brain, and that the brain is where thinking is carried on, even 
though we can still say it is the human being or person that thinks. Given this 
conception of thinking, locating thinking as an activity will be quite different 
than locating a mental event called a thought. A thought can be viewed as an 
abstraction and as having no location. This example shows that the location 
problem depends on our view of particular mental concepts. 
 This completes the sketch of the way our mental concepts may 
influence the location problem. We do not take a stand on the problem here. 
We have focused on one strand of the problem: the locus of the subject of 
mental states. The purpose is to display some of the alternatives and 
difficulties involved. It should be clear that materialism does not depend on 
which alternative we adopt for its plausibility. Smart does not have to make 
the claims he does about the possibility of the brain having  mental 
experiences in vitro in order to hold that mental goings on are brain 
processes. The truth of materialism is independent of which physical thing is 
the subject of experiences or of exactly where particular mental events and  
processes are located. A referee has asked whether a dualist can accept the 
brain in vitro example and maintain that the soul that is nonphysical and 
immaterial can be interacting with the brain. The materialist holds that 
disembodied minds are a logical possibility, but in fact the mental is identical 
with physical states of a subject or person. As I said, I have argued elsewhere 
that in self-awareness we are aware of ourselves as being something, as 
being a thing that is having mental experiences, but our self-awareness does 
not tell us anything about whether that something is physical or nonphysical 
                                                 
11   Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose, Ch. 11, pp. 157-161. 
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in nature. We just cannot know that by looking within ourselves. The 
materialist holds that the self or subject is in fact something physical in 
nature. Dualism or an immaterial subject remains only a logical possibility. 
 Smart's suggestion that the brain may have mental experiences in 
vitro remains a focal issue for the outcome of the problem. For if a brain as 
such could have mental states without the rest of the body, there is a sense in 
which mental states or events are in, or states of, the brain and there is a clear  
way in which the brain is that part of a person that has mental states. And if 
the brain is the locus of mental states, it must be able to have mental 
experiences in vitro under some possible conditions.We conclude that if 
cognitive scientists and philosophers continue to locate mental states and 
events in states of the human body, it will be reasonable to locate the subject 
of mental states in the body and brain combined; in the whole embodied 
person. Dualists who think the location problem facing materialism is a good 
objection to materialism have been refuted by the empirical and theoretical 
developments in cognitive science. 
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